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bargai[s85,jmc]		The bases for a bargain with the Soviet Union

	There might be a basis for bargains with the Soviet Union
involving matters not previously negotiated.

	There are many things we want from the Soviet Union and
many things they want from us.  Some of the things they want from
us and some of the things we want from them are non-negotiable;
neither country could give them up without fundamentally changing
its character.  Others can be given provided the price is right.
We will concentrate on the negotiable items, but the items that
are probably non-negotiable will be mentioned, because either side
may indulge in either wishful thinking or propaganda leading it
to ask for what the other side cannot give.

	While the previous paragraph is written symmetrically between
the U.S. and the Soviet Union, I don't want to imply that the the
two countries are similar, especially morally.  The Soviet
Union is an ``evil empire'' to use President Reagan's phrase.
Since there doesn't seem to be any feasible way of getting rid of it,
we have to explore what advantages there might be in negotiating
with it.  Also while it would be nice to get the better of it in
negotiations, I believe that what can be obtained by cleverness
is marginal.  The bargains I suggest are genuinely of advantage
to both the U.S. and to the Party bosses of the Soviet Union.

	The largest area for bargaining I have to suggest is some of our
technology for some of their secrecy.  Here ``our'' refers to the
West in general and not just to the U.S.  Most likely the
intergovernmental agreements would only involve export licenses.
They would still have to pay the owners of specific technologies.

	First consider why they might want our agreement on
technology badly enough to pay something.  Their technology
is inferior and they show no signs of catching up in the
forseeable future.  In the important area of computer technology,
which I have followed, it seems to me that they are further
behind than they were in 1965 when I made my first visit to
the Soviet Union.

	They make extensive efforts to steal technology, and
these efforts are often successful, but stealing is no substitute
for buying.  This is because fully successful use of technology
developed elsewhere require continued interaction with the
developers.  It requires the ability to ask questions when
difficulties arise.  It requires continued access to improved versions
of the technology; otherwise one gets into blind alleys.

	I remember visiting a Chinese computer that I suspect was built
with smuggled integrated circuits.  While it was a good computer,
it wasn't going into mass production, and I suspect that was because
there was no guarantee of a continued supply of the circuits.
Even if improved relations might permit a continued supply, it
might be that what they succeeded in smuggling represented a line
of development that was later discontinued.  When such items are
bought legitimately for production prototypes, the contracts
contain agreements about continued supply and often provide for
the licensing of a second source to protect the buyer even if
the original supplier goes broke.

	Even when the Soviets are permitted to buy Western
technology, their own command economy and penchant for secrecy
often leads them to lose the benefits.  Part of the problem is
that permission to buy the technology and the negotiation of
the terms involves at least the Soviet organization that wants
it and the Ministry of Foreign trade that jealously guards its
monopoly on foreign trade (a measure instituted by Lenin himself
and currently regarded as sacred).  One can imagine that the
situation is actually worse than that.  The permission probably
goes through the ministerial hierarchy above the user of the
technology and the relevant supervisory parts of the Party
bureaucracy.  Any of these organizations can inject delays into
the original deal or into resupply arrangements.  If getting
continued foreign assistance might involve foreigners
finding out about Soviet deficiencies, the Party, the KGB and
the military may all have veto power.

	We can laugh at their falling over their own feet, but
if we want something in return for the technology, it has to be
a good buy for them.  In so far as what we trade for access to
the technology is their secrecy, this obviates one of their
difficulties in maintaining the buyer-seller arrangements.

	Now let's consider our desire to reduce their secrecy.
They are quite good at keeping secrets, both from foreigners
and from their own people.  Foreigners are forbidden to visit
most of the Soviet Union including the whole Ural industrial
area including some cities of over a million population.
These prohibitions include people from their satellite countries.
The restrictions have two levels.  About a third of the country
is officially closed to foreigners, but most of the area that
is nominally open is effectively closed by non-co-operation
on the part of the Intourist organization.

	Of course, we have our satellite observations.  I don't
know what their capabilities are, but it worries me that we
have depended on them for twenty years without ``ground truth''
to verify our interpretations.  Worse, we have negotiated with
them about disarmament on the basis of our own observations of
what they have.  This means that they can test their ability
to conceal a particular military-industrial activity by
seeing if we mention it.  The uncertainty probably has the
effect that the military assume the worst and demand a margin
of safety from the negotiators of arms reduction, and this
margin may reduce the possibility of agreement.

	There is no doubt that the secrecy is a real advantage to
them.  Reading ``Khrushchev Remembers'' suggests that a major advantage
to them is that it conceals weaknesses.  However, if we knew about
these weaknesses we might be able to reduce our military expenditures.
However, it also conceals their operational plans.  We apparently
were caught by surprise in 1968 by the invasion of Czechoslovakia
and in 1979 by the invasion of Afghanistan.  It will take quite
a swap of technology to get them to open their country.
On the other hand full access to Western technology would be very
valuable to them.

	As far as technology goes, partial access is entirely
feasible if we only can only get a partial lifting of the
Iron Curtain.

Remarks:

	1. What do we want beyond the right for foreigners to
travel throughout the Soviet Union.  Surely, this must involve
a relaxation of the laws punishing talking to foreigners.
Presumably, we also want the right to install equipment to
monitor nuclear tests.

	2. In my opinion the abolition of nuclear weapons is not
a desirable goal.  It makes the world too unstable with regard
to a race for their re-introduction.  Facilities with other uses
that are easily converted to produce components for nuclear
weapons are too difficult to define.  Restrictions on what
scientists are allowed to know that is convertible into the
ability to make nuclear weapons.
There is also the problem of third parties.  

	Another major area of possible negotiation concerns human
rights.  This involves pitfalls of several kinds.  First why should
we pay them to respect rights they ought to respect without payment?
Second, improving civil rights in the Soviet Union is a good thing,
but it isn't a vital interest of the United States.

	Different people will have different attitudes towards these
questions.  My own view is pragmatic and relatively generous, i.e.
I'm willing to pay bribes to people who don't deserve them provided
we get what we're paying for, and I favor paying quite bit for
human rights.

	Concretely, we should consider buying freedom for individuals
as the West Germans do with East Germany.  However, we have to worry
about the price escalating and their arresting people in order to
ransom them.  In spite of these obstacles, I think it's worth a try.
Besides, the more the Soviets leaders demonstrate their moral corruption,
the more likely it is that some new generation of leaders will become
disgusted with the whole system and make more drastic changes.

The current (1985 May) news indicates that the arms control negotiations
are unlikely to make any substantial breakthrough in the near future.
However, since the Gorbachev regime seems to be in a mood for some
agreements, it is worthwhile to explore other areas than arms control.
There is no need to suspend the arms control talks, merely to put them
on the back burner.  Admittedly it would be nice to get our best
negotiators, e.g. Max Kampelman, to work on more promising issues.

Perhaps there will be more success on arms control if we can bargain
away some of their secrecy.  However, they are clearly not motivated
to give up any significant secrecy just to aid arms control negotiation.

Here are some matters on which progress is unlikely to be made until
there are some fundamental changes in the attitude of the Soviet leaders.

We would like more freedom for the ``captive nations'', but Gorbachev
didn't become general secretary to oversee the liquidation of the Soviet
Empire.

They won't abandon support for communists elsewhere.  However, the magnitude
of this support may be negotiable, but most likely only secretly.
This support would be far less important to us if we could acquire the
political strength to apply our military and economic strength to beating
communist attempts to take over countries.  It wasn't the level of
Soviet support to North Vietnam that was the main cause of its conquest
of the South.  The Soviet Union would only grumble if we were even
to occupy Nicaragua.  The Soviet conquest of Afghanistan wouldn't have
occurred if the military men who supported the earlier coup hadn't
convinced themselves that leftist slogans were a surer route to power
than rightist ones or non-ideological ones.

They would like our press to stop criticizing them and to stop providing
forums for emigres and dissidents.  We can't agree to that.

Good will is not to be had in relations with the Soviet Union.  The best
a non-communist political leader can get credit for when he does something
they like is ``realism''.  Realism is explained as doing what the communists
want, because you realize that resistance is futile.  When you subsequently
do something they don't like, you are diagnosed as having gone mad.
Reagan should not kiss Gorbachev.

What the Soviet Union does is more readily explained as power politics
than by Marxism-Leninism.  Nevertheless, Marxist-Leninist ideology,
however decayed, puts constraints on how Soviet leaders think, the
language they use in their internal discussions, and on what agreements
can be made with them.  ``Khrushchev Remembers'' and all the memoirs
by communists who have had dealings with the Soviet leadership from
Stalin on shows that the language they use is constrained by this
dogma.  It is important to remember that there is no frank political
writing in the Soviet Union, however secret.  It is simply to dangerous
to put on paper views that can be used against the writer.  For this
reason, political thought is almost certainly extremely constrained.
Gorbachev himself has to be very careful.  This is not meant to suggest
that his thinking is unorthodox.  Such a speculation would be wishful
thinking on all present evidence.

For this reason Western analyses of the Soviet situation are potentially
influential provided they don't start from premisses that seem obviously
false to a Soviet reader.

I know of no study of the actual role of ideology in the Soviet leadership.

It would be worthwhile to find an expert or at least an expert informant.
What about Shevchenko?

Questions:

	1. How much technology for how much secrecy?

	2. Is their draft law negotiable?

	3. The Soviets would like the West to permanently
 lay off on its criticism
of their human rights abuses.  This is clearly not negotiable, if for
no other reason than that it would meaning restricting free speech and
free press, since it is impossible to imagine that everyone would agree
to a bargain involving this.  However, it agreements might be possible
that would involve specific high officials laying off for a specific
period, e.g. for the balance of a presidential term.  In order for the
political and moral costs to be acceptable, what was traded for the
layoff would have to include a substantial human rights payoff, e.g.
the release of the major known cases.  If some important case were
left out, it would involve abandoning a some identified person to his
fate.  Of course, after the major releases, new cases would arise that
would have to be part of the next bargain, but if a lay-off were part
of the bargain, officials would have to keep to it.  It would be
better if the bargain were bipartisan as far as the U.S. is concerned,
but that might conflict with necessary secrecy.

There is one kind of swap that might be relatively easy, but it is
in the nature of a swindle on them, and so probably won't work more
than once.  Every once in a while the Soviet press picks up on some
ordinary criminal in the U.S. and declares him a victim of racism or
something else.
I see no disadvantage in selling them just about any ordinary
criminal, even one condemned to death for political murder,
for just about any price they are willing to pay - even nothing.
However, the first time they get one and see what they have, they won't be
eager for any more.